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REFLEXIVITY: RECURSION AND RELATIONALITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESEARCH PROCESSES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Varieties of reflective and reflexive processes have been discussed in the literature, and often 
used both instrumentally, as in the academic context of ‘professional development’ – through 
research-oriented reflective interviews (Chivers, 2003), mentoring processes (Schlee, 2000) 
or socialised fellowship (Ballou, Bowers, Boyatzis and Kolb, 1999) and at more challenging 
levels of introspection. This process of introspection is often argued to be necessarily 
personal (Doane, 2003), whilst others suggest it may perhaps be extended by working 
creatively with others (Arvay, 2003) to develop insights as a community.  
 
Within those perspectives and possibilities for reflexivity found in the literature, and which 
are explored later in this paper, we believe that two inter-related processes are being 
described. One of these is relatively more commonly used and more explicit – reflection – 
whilst the other has remained implicit in many of these perspectives. The less fully 
characterized process is that of recursion. Given the close relationships between these terms 
we begin by offering our definitions before moving on to the substance of our argument. 
First, reflection suggests a mirror image which affords the opportunity to engage in an 
observation or examination of our ways of doing. When we experience reflection we become 
observers of our own practice. Reflexivity however, suggests a complexification of thinking 
and experience, or thinking about experience. Thus, we regard reflexivity as a process of 
exposing or questioning our ways of doing. As such reflexivity is related to reflection yet is 
qualitatively different from it. Finally, recursion suggests a return, a process of defining 
something in terms of itself and thus a returning to our ways of doing. Hence, reflexivity is 
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more than reflection. What is implied is that, through questioning the bases of our 
interpretations, reflexivity necessarily brings about change in the process of reflection – it is 
thereby recursive. There is, of course, interaction between these two process dimensions of 
reflection and recursion; but our argument in this paper is that neither has been characterized 
effectively in relation to the other, which in turn inhibits and confuses the debate about the 
nature of the process of reflexivity in research methods.  
 
The aim of the paper is therefore to develop an integrated treatment of these dimensions. 
Further, this paper seeks to offer a better understanding of the types (or modes) of reflexivity 
through characterising various patterns of interaction between reflection and recursion, and 
show first, how these patterns might be experienced in organizational contexts and second 
how organizational researchers may experience these modes differently. 
 
In developing a characterisation of the nature and processes of reflexivity, however, we also 
aim to illustrate how it may be regarded as a set of instrumental practices, used in the 
research process, and as a process which challenges the organizational researcher as well as 
her research. That is, we aim to show that a fully conceived, reflexivity is a process affecting 
the whole way of life of reflexive researchers (Cunliffe, 2003; Etherington, 2004; Shotter, 
2006) and, indeed, reflexive practitioners more generally (Cunliffe, 2004; Marshall and 
Reason, 2007; Shotter, 2005). In our characterisation of this process we contend that an 
instrumental view of reflexivity may, as part of a research process, be a means to ends type of 
thinking and within conscious activity. A fully conceived view may largely be an 
unconscious act for some researchers. However, our hope is that the discussion set out in this 
paper might help bring into consciousness that which has hitherto been unspoken. As authors, 
we of course face the challenge of engaging in a recursive process about the writing in which 
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we are involved. To be clear, our stance is not intended to be polemical in that we are not 
seeking to suggest that a fully conceived view is a more desirable state. Rather, the review 
process for the paper itself encouraged us to arrive at the suggestion that a fuller set of 
insights may be more enlightening, especially when recognised as part of the research 
process.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, the dimension of recursion in reflexivity is explored 
and characterized. This is followed by a treatment of the second dimension, that of reflection. 
After these two sections an integrative discussion is developed, leading to the elaboration of 
four particular steps that collectively describe a meta-process of reflexivity. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the implications for research practice and possibilities for 
future research on reflexivity. 
 
RECURSION IN REFLEXIVITY 
There are two forms of recursion in reflexivity that are implied, but are rather hidden, in the 
literature. The first of these implied modes of recursion is regarded as a directed, active 
process. The identification of this as an active mode of recursion is least evident in some 
notions of reflexivity that see it as unproblematically ‘correcting for bias’ (such approaches 
are extensively reviewed and critiqued in Woolgar, 1988 and Holland, 1999). The recursion 
is invisible in works that treat reflexivity in this way because being reflexive is described as a 
process of correcting organizational research rather than developing the organizational 
researcher (or more generically, adapting concepts without adapting the process of 
conceptualization), although to a degree both must go hand-in-hand. As a minimum, there 
would be some extension of the individual’s conceptual framework in acknowledging new 
questions or problems that were hitherto unexplicated before embarking on an active 
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reflexive process. In contrast to this relatively well hidden conceptualization of active 
recursion there are rather more deliberate and clearly described processes of recursive 
change, such as the reflexive undermining delineated by Cunliffe (2003), Archer’s (2007) 
notion of ‘autonomous reflexivity’ which incorporates reaction to shock or failure, and 
Gidden’s (1990) characterization of feedback in the development of social practices. In such 
cases the researcher herself is intentionally disrupted in the process of reflexive research; 
although this might be regarded as kenotic, as a self-emptying, the process does seem to leave 
something of the researcher behind. That remnant is necessarily different from the researcher 
who initiated the reflexive process – although they may become locked into the recursive 
aspect of the process, with the risk of entering a pathological spiral of doubt (Cunliffe 2003). 
 
The second mode of recursion is perhaps less well described in the literature because it is 
radically different from the ‘classic’ conceptualization of reflexivity as an active cognitive 
process. In contradistinction to this popular conceptualization, there are a number of authors 
that talk of reflexivity as an unconscious process by which the process of reflection is itself 
modified (Beck, 1994; Hoogenboom and Ossewaardwe 2005; Adams, 2003, 2006). This idea 
of a passively experienced mode of recursion can itself be described in two quite different 
ways.  
 
On the one hand, there is the possibility of the individual organizational researcher being 
locked into a theoretical perspective through recursive processes that simply reinforce the 
current set of understandings that they employ. This can be conceived in two ways. First, the 
researcher may be seen as dominated by structural influences; this is typified in Bordieu’s 
work, as exemplified in his statement that “I know that I am caught up and comprehended in 
the world that I take as my object” (Bordieu 2004:115). This means, of course, that the 
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structurally dominated researcher’s notion of reflexivity can only be delusional. 
Alternatively, conceiving individuals as possessing “inalienable powers of human reflexivity” 
(Archer, 2007:11) can lead to a sense of denial about the structures we talk in and through, 
which thus become unquestionable. These two extremes might both lead to the same flaw for 
different reasons, most commonly a conviction that everything has an explanation that can be 
described in a way that relates to the precepts of the natural sciences – or else it is anomalous 
or false. Every encounter with data can be treated in such a way that it reinforces this 
presumption and structural influences remain undisturbed. As McKenna (2007) has 
suggested, the requirement to use acceptable ‘strategic apparatus’ in arriving at research 
results can be more important to the perceived value of the research than any putative ‘truth’ 
claims that can be made of it. Similarly, from the opposite end of an intractable debate, a 
religious fundamentalist who sees their foundational text as providing the complete 
description of the world and a pattern for living – anything else being heretical or evil – has a 
complete system within which all experience can be captured. Of course, both of these 
caricatures are easily defeated – the former by the strong foundations problem[1] and the latter 
by the existence of multiple competing texts – but the kind of reinforcing, repetitious 
recursion which resembles these extreme pictures still seems to be possible. 
 
There are alternative conceptualizations which see the process of reflexivity being driven in 
conversation with others (Cunliffe, 2003; Driver, 2007). One such example is Cunliffe’s 
practice of social poetics where she notes “I began to videotape my conversations with 
managers. I then videotaped a second conversation where I, and the manager, watched the 
first video and commented on what ‘struck’ us, how we connected and created meaning” 
(2002b:142). Here change is effected through participation. In such cases the organizational 
researcher is changed in the process by giving up (at least to a degree) the notion of 
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independently directing the process of reflexivity and is open to the insights and challenges of 
others. The challenge here is the degree to which the researcher is genuinely open to the 
other, rather than choosing to filter and challenge concepts that emerge in dialogue against 
the standard of their existing understanding. Archer (2007) has characterized these 
alternatives as either meta-reflexivity (in which people become engaged with and 
transformed by radically different communities) or autonomous reflexivity (where the focus 
is upon the individual’s self reliance and instrumental ‘success’). In these conceptualizations 
autonomous reflexivity is likely to be associated with achievement, but is rather narrow in its 
breadth of reflection, as in the case of the autonomously reflexive industrial magnate with an 
“intense focus on business and rendering all aspects of life in the language of business”, 
described by Mutch (2007:1132). In comparison, meta-reflexivity leads to a richer, values-
oriented approach. Archer does not suggest, however, that the ‘meta-reflexive’ has 
completely surrendered herself to the values of the other; rather her characterizations (see 
especially Archer 2007:302) suggest that there is a difficult balance, between the 
hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of doubt (Ricoeur, 1981), involving internal and 
external reflexive conversations. This perhaps emphasises the inevitable interpenetration of 
reflective and recursive processes in reflexive research. Accordingly, it is to the dimension of 
reflection that the discussion now turns. 
 
REFLECTION IN REFLEXIVITY 
The reflective element of reflexive processes is relatively well characterised, although in 
some cases it can be difficult to be sure that the process actually incorporates reflexivity, 
rather than being a purely reflective process. This is perhaps most apparent in the connection 
with the ‘repetitious’ aspect of recursion outlined above, where confirmatory thoughts are 
sought and found through modes of reflection which are deliberately constrained by 
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established principles. Perhaps surprisingly, some works on reflexivity describe modes of 
reflection which resemble this; although usually amongst other processes (critiques of a wide 
range of such positions are provided by Woolgar, 1988 and Holland, 1999). A useful 
characterisation of the ultimate ‘lower limit’ of reflection is described by Cunliffe (2004) as 
‘reflex action’ – in which an automatic response to situations is invoked. By definition, this 
purely draws upon background processes rather than actually foregrounding reflection. 
Similarly Archer’s conceptualization of ‘communicative reflexivity’ describes the situation of 
individuals whose reflection on key choices seems to be dominated by prevailing tacit norms 
in their community (see especially her description of the case of a man who became a miner, 
like his father and all of his male friends, rather than taking either of the safer and easier 
alternative positions found for him by female relatives – Archer, 2007:159-160). 
 
A more developed and relatively widespread characterization focuses on the active and 
deliberate reflection of the individual on a particular process of conceptualization, with a 
view to developing and supporting validity claims (Bordieu, 2004; Giddens, 1990; Hardy and 
Clegg, 1997; McKenna, 2007). In the research context such processes are focussed on the 
elimination of bias and other flaws, but as suggested earlier they may have an effect on the 
organizational researcher if they are taken seriously. However there is a concern with the 
possibility of optimisation and robustness implicit in such approaches; and this comes with a 
whole set of theoretical assumptions that are unlikely to be unpacked. What is achieved in 
such a mode is therefore likely to be a reflective extension of the current research framework 
through filling in some discovered gaps and/or adapting it to ‘make it work’ in the particular 
situation of interest. 
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Both of the possibilities for reflection characterised above are reliant upon the organizational 
researcher controlling and guiding the process. However, there are also possibilities for 
reflection to be guided by someone (or something) other than the researcher. Two particular 
characterisations of other-directed reflection can be envisaged. In the first, the process can 
begin with an accidental disruption to the individual’s practice in which they are ‘struck’ 
(Cunliffe, 2002) and begin to realise that their patterns of sensemaking are inadequate. 
Shotter (2005:120) argues that this ability to “notice crucial distinctions” is central to 
Wittgenstein’s work, which is an influential source of thought in this area. This experience of 
‘being struck’, or ‘noticing’, can trigger a process of opening up reflection to the insights and 
theories of others, thereby disrupting existing patterns and undermining total reliance on the 
self (Cunliffe, 2002a; Raelin, 2001). In the second of these possible processes, the researcher 
becomes absorbed into the patterns of collective thinking offered by the other, or joins with 
them to develop a new understanding which is mutually developed through the fusion of 
horizons (Gadamer, 1998).  
 
INTEGRATING THE DIMENSIONS: TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE PROCESS 
As the many overlaps in the preceding discussion have perhaps implied, it is possible (and 
perhaps helpful) to re-integrate the two dimensions of recursion and reflection within 
reflexive processes. Doing so can yield the conceptualization provided as figure 1. 
 
Take in Figure 1 here 
 
Much of the character of each of the four possibilities outlined in figure 1 has already been 
alluded to above. For that reason the explication of these elements in this section of the paper 
will be relatively brief and focussed on the ways in which a meta-process of reflexivity might 
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be understood to operate across all of them. The discussion of this process connects, to a 
degree, with Cunliffe’s (2004) view of reflexivity as a radically moral project rather than 
simply the advocacy of techniques by which managers or organizational researchers might be 
(more) effective. As she points out, a critically reflexive process necessarily involves 
overlapping existential, praxis-related and relational concerns, as the following discussion 
will seek to elaborate. Accordingly, although our discussion is primarily concerned with how 
organizational researchers may experience reflexivity, we do also draw on examples that 
illustrate the ways in which reflexivity is also important in organizational contexts. The 
description of the process of reflexivity is addressed in our discussions in four steps, which 
correlate with the quadrants of figure 1.  
 
In describing each of the four steps, particular aspects and readings of a number of works are 
incorporated. It must be emphasized that there are other aspects to many of the works 
discussed in this way. This treatment is not intended to provide a full characterization of any 
particular author’s work, but it merely establishes some common themes that link the 
different approaches and outputs into a more general framework. The engagement with the 
framework begins below with the quadrant characterised as repetition.  
 
Repetition 
This initial step in the meta-process of reflexivity describes a situation in which an individual 
is reflecting in a relatively closed, self-focussed manner and recursivity operates passively. 
Woolgar’s (1988) classification of varieties of reflexivity elegantly captures this process 
under the rubric of benign introspection. Such a process has the intent of reflexivity, but stays 
within the accepted boundaries of thought for addressing a particular issue or process (as 
exemplified in Archer’s (2007) discussion of ‘communicative reflexivity’, alluded to earlier). 
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Such non-challenging processes, sitting at the ‘lower end’ of the reflexive spectrum, have 
also been identified in other categorisations such as those provided by Holland (1999) and 
Cunliffe (2004). in organizational contexts, Cunliffe’s (2002a) research provides examples of 
how this repetitive – rather closed and limited - mode of reflexivity is enacted. For example, 
one of her interviewees suggested, in relation to performance reviews: “So it’s not . . . a 
category might be problem solving but the dialogue that’s there [on the review form], the 
instructions, the informative words that are put there, encourage you into a real reactive kind 
of mode. It’s like: ‘exhibits ability to...’; it’s very bounded. It’s bounded language, you 
know? It’s saying objectify this like an objective statement: ‘This person is a good problem 
solver—check ‘is’ or ‘isn’t.’ I think too few managers reflect upon even how to answer that 
question—it’s a very reactive answer.” (Cunliffe, 2002:142). 
 
Perhaps more controversially, similar processes of reactivity and repetition can be identified 
in research processes. In particular, there is a grey area where treatments that describe a 
scientific elimination of bias through accepted and well-characterised (often statistical) 
techniques might also be considered to be rather closed modes of reflexivity, that also have a 
passive recursive effect. Bourdieu’s work on reflexivity might be characterized in this way 
(see Bourdieu (2004) for a summation of his thought in this area); indeed, Karakayali’s 
(2004) review of Bourdieu’s work on reflexivity seems to imply that it has fallen victim to a 
form of scientism; the fascination which science can have with its own schemes seems to 
preclude any radical or critical reflexivity. Such a characterisation may or may not be fair, but 
it seems reasonable to suggest that there are many situations in which the potential for 
reflexivity to open up the processes of thought and action to recursive change merely 
supports a kind of complacent re-inscription and reinforcement.  
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Extension 
Processes begin to look more convincingly like the kind of reflexivity that involves a 
questioning of self when there is at least some extension, some building of new principles or 
understandings that connect with well-known principles but is not subsumed within them. 
The transition to this mode of extension possibly requires some failure or exogenous shock, 
that induces the feeling of ‘being struck’ (Cunliffe, 2002a) – the revelatory sensation that 
existing notions are inadequate, that promotes a more active mode of reflexive engagement. 
The extension mode of reflexivity describes processes where the mode of reflection is still 
relatively closed and focused on the self, but recursive processes are rather more active – 
there is a conscious involvement in change. This correlates, to a degree, with Archer’s (2007) 
notion of ‘autonomous reflexivity’, with its strong link to action and correlation to previous 
shocks (in the form of failure). For example, she records how an individual who had 
experienced failure in an arts-related field that he imagined would be satisfying (“I went to do 
computer-aided design, started to do a diploma at college in basic art and design […] and it 
just bored me to tears to be honest”) later used his existing skills, differently applied, to train 
and succeed in a more technical profession: “I started this new job, got a little bit hooked by 
it, and then I could sort of see that I need to do this, go on this course, go on that course and 
build up” (Archer, 2007:121-125). 
 
In the most general terms, however, the mode of extension seems to be most succinctly 
characterized in the work of Giddens (1990:38): “The reflexivity of modern social life 
consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of 
incoming information about those very practices, thus constantly altering their character”. 
This is very much about the individual modifying their own practice through a personal 
critique of social life. It is self-reflexivity – a critique of habitual practices – as described by 
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Cunliffe and Jun (2005); the individual is concerned about her own role in the construction of 
social life, but for herself and on her terms. Such a process can perhaps be as ambitious as 
that described by Hardy and Clegg (1997:S13), who suggest that “Reflexive theoretical 
positions are those best able to account for their own theorizing, as well as whatever it is they 
theorize about”. Whilst on the one hand this kind of reflexive position seems to be the height 
of cognitive achievement, on the other hand it might be considered essentially introspective. 
Hardy and Clegg (1997) and Hardy, Phillips and Clegg (2001) do go further than this – and 
into the borders of something more open to the other, something more potentially disruptive, 
in two ways, First, in their presentation of ‘pluralistic theoretical communities’ – that is, 
groups of authors in vigorous debate with each other – as means of theoretical challenge and 
development. Secondly, they highlight the postmodern destabilization of the notion of the 
research subject as an isolatable target of study. Of course, neither of these positions 
necessarily disrupts the organizational researcher. In the former case, the researcher can be 
driven into a more trenchant position, using every rhetorical device at their command to 
‘fight their corner’. In the latter case, the researcher may be left doubting the other – not 
themself. In a similar vein, Alvesson’s reflexive pragmatism involves “working with alternate 
lines of interpretation(s) and vocabularies and reinterpreting the favoured lines of 
understanding through the systematic involvement of alternative points of departure.” 
(2003:14). Here the intention is to avoid an overly comfortable interpretation of the research 
process and outcomes but within a closed framing of the researcher themself. 
 
Putatively objective concerns for the social context of theory production, as described above, 
can be extended into explicit concerns for relationships, power and exploitation in the 
research context, as described in Mauthner and Doucet’s (2003) treatment of reflexivity. 
These are worthy and noble issues to address, but they still do not open the organizational 
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researcher’s thinking up to radical disruption; there is no sense of unease or instability here 
that would be expected if radical reflexivity was beginning to develop (Cunliffe, 2003). The 
question that then arises is how one might more effectively describe or locate the blurred 
boundary from the process of extension (active, but closed and reliant on the self) to the 
process of disruption (active and open to the other). The beginnings of this transition might 
well be identified in emotion rather than cognition, since Weinstein (1979) has suggested that 
a developed reflexive position should include attention to emotional responses. Most 
particularly, the transition to the disruptive mode of reflexivity might be connected to 
emotional experiences that are relational by definition, such as shame, guilt, embarrassment 
and pride. Garrety et al (2003) have suggested that such emotions are both indicators and 
outputs of reflexivity. In the generation of such seemingly simple emotions, there is a sense 
of some kind of ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ in relation to the live presence of the other, rather 
than in relation to cold philosophical principles.  
 
Another ‘live’ characterization is provided by Parker (2004); although his article is definitely 
self-reflexive, it presents something of a borderline case as he does explore a number of 
decisions and actions that he can’t quite account for within his own thinking. This suggests 
that the process of ‘becoming manager’ that he describes has at least some unconscious, 
participative recursive aspects. It is also a borderline case for a second reason. That is, it is 
possible to read his ‘interrupted’ style of reflexive writing – the deliberately frequent use of 
footnotes as he re-read and re-wrote the work – as a dialogue with the self as other, displaced 
and distanciated in time. This connects with the thought of Weinstein (1979), who has 
highlighted the temporal dimension of the researcher and the effects this can have on research 
processes. However, there is perhaps a requirement for a synchronic engagement with others 
to fully open up patterns of thinking and action to disruption, as might be suggested by the 
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role of the reviewers in Parker’s (2004) case. It is to this kind of engaged mode of reflexivity 
that the discussion now turns. 
 
Disruption 
Interestingly, it is possible to locate a more radical, engaged and disruptive mode of 
reflexivity in relatively early works, such as Gouldner (1970). In this work he suggested that 
“a reflexive sociology is distinguished by its refusal to segregate the intimate or personal 
from the public and collective, or the everyday life from the occasional ‘political’ act” 
(Gouldner, 1970:504). This perhaps sets the context, or frames the possibilities, for the kind 
of disruptive reflexivity that this conceptual stage of the process is intended to capture. In this 
mode of reflexivity, reflection is relatively open and guided by the other, whilst recursive 
processes remain active.  
 
Woolgar (1988), Weick (1999) and Cunliffe (2003) each highlight the risk of a spiral of 
doubt for those engaged in such a process, as deeper and deeper foundational notions can be 
opened to radical critique – and abandoned. This can be a painful process, perhaps linking 
with the notion of ‘fractured reflexivity’, in which individuals may find that “internal 
conversations intensify their distress and disorientation rather than leading to purposeful 
courses of action” (Archer, 2007:93).  
 
In organizational contexts, Parker (2004) shows how the experience of disruption can lead to 
disassociation from the organization and one’s role within it. After completing his paper, 
Parker abandoned his management role and status, and found a non-management professorial 
role in another academic institution. Furthermore, the institution that he joined was at that 
time a radical group, strongly critical of the kind of managerial action that Parker had found 
15 
himself, to his growing discomfort, engaging in. Similarly, in the case of the researcher, it is 
to be expected that this painful process will be kenotic and leads to an abandonment of 
particular bases for reason and action, rather than the continuing extension of well-known 
frameworks. This is a ‘clearing out’ to make room for the ideas of the other, as perhaps 
envisaged in Cunliffe’s (2002a) reflexive dialogical process. Such a dialogic process 
highlights the hidden ideologies and tacit assumptions that are enacted in our practices and 
ways of talking; it is (or should be) an unsettling process as the insidiousness of our many 
assumptions and interlinked interpretations can be difficult to unravel and disconnect. This 
mode of reflexivity is therefore necessarily messy. It introduces doubt and contradiction in a 
way that is clearly distinct from the routine or systematic confirmatory reflexive modes of 
repetition and extension discussed earlier. It is the kind of process that merits the title of 
critical reflexivity (Cunliffe and Jun, 2005), in which our thoughts and experiences are 
questioned and made more complex through the inputs of others. The role of the other seems 
to be centrally important in truly radical self-critique (Gadamer, 1977), and Holland (1999) 
has suggested that the fullest conceptualization of reflexivity includes the transition from an 
individual to a collective, social level.  
 
The messy process of disruption may seem to be potentially endless, but Weick (1999) has 
suggested that a limitation can be placed upon the consequent undermining spiral of doubt, 
by choosing to apply ‘instrumental reflexivity’. Alvesson, Hardy and Harley (2008) 
essentially agree with this approach, suggesting that reflexivity should be first applied in 
deconstructive and then reconstructive manoeuvres, such that the research findings are 
challenged and perhaps changed, although there is no real risk of the organizational 
researcher being changed in such a process. What both of these papers seem to suggest is 
that one should pull back from the brink by conducting a deliberately shallow review rather 
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than falling into the depths. But is such ‘instrumental reflexivity’ simply a commitment to the 
appearance of reflexivity? Indeed, does it not simply serve the needs of academic rhetoric 
and sidestep, as Conklin (2007) implies, the moral project that reflexivity should be – the 
openness to questioning by and for the other? For this reason, this paper seeks to argue that 
the completion of the reflexive project lies not in paddling in the shallows, but in diving in to 
the deeps of the other, in becoming engulfed in participation. 
 
Participation 
The last of the modes of reflexivity described in figure 1, is participation; in this mode, 
reflection is open to the other but the recursive process has become passive. This passiveness 
is something more than inertness, however. It is the consequence of choosing to trust the 
other and engage seriously with their view. Arguably, taking another’s view seriously in a 
reflexive sense requires more than a critical appreciation of it. It requires that it be lived as if 
it was authoritative. If partners in dialogue (rather than a subject-object relation) are both 
seeking to do this, then a kind of syncretism might be the outcome at the collective level. 
This kind of syncretist participation is hinted at in Hoogenboom and Ossewaardwe’s notion 
of integrative ‘reflexive authority’, which they define as “the belief in the ability of 
institutions and actors to negotiate, reconcile and represent arguments, interests, identities and 
abilities” (2005:614). Going further, one might argue with Adams, (2003, 2006) that this 
participative, negotiated, reconciled character is an aspect of all modes of reflexivity, in that 
all reflexive projects are embedded and socialized culturally, historically and linguistically. 
Similarly, Marshall and Reason argue that it is necessary “to see evocative evidence of the 
researcher as both alive and disciplined in the research account, so that we can judge the 
quality of their doing of research” (2007:376).  
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However, the important point here is that the mode of participation does not describe the de 
facto embeddedness of the reflexive organizational researcher. Rather, it describes the 
situation in which one comes to choose to engage with a particular community and be 
transformed by it. Archer’s (2007) ‘meta-reflexive’ types provide good examples of this kind 
of participative reflexivity, particularly in cases of involvement with religious and artistic 
communities; individuals become disinterested in organizational success per se, and there is 
both an attraction to a ‘higher calling’ and an engagement with a broader community or 
deeper tradition. For those engaged in research projects, there is a need to consider what 
consequences might ensue from such acts of deliberate participation, of an intentional, 
relational ‘between-ness’ (Cunliffe, 2003; Shotter, 2005, 2006), constructed in conversations 
in which researchers and the researched (and perhaps reviewers – Driver, 2007) are mutually 
involved. In considering this, Cunliffe identifies a number of the consequences of radical 
approaches – and four of these may be argued to be particularly important differentiators of 
participation as a mode of reflexivity. That is, it can be argued to involve: “acknowledging 
the constitutive nature of our research conversations; constructing ‘emerging practical 
theories’ rather than objective truths; exposing the situated nature of accounts through 
narrative circularity; focusing on life and research as a process of becoming rather than 
already established truth” (Cunliffe, 2003:991). Such differentiators may help to explain why 
some remain unconvinced “that ‘mainstream’ management journals want the full-blooded 
sense of inquiry that alive and disciplined research might offer.” (Marshall and Reason, 
2007:376). 
 
In the participation mode of reflexivity the organizational researcher, at least partially, gives 
over the direction and meaning of the research, and herself, to the other(s). It is not argued 
that this surrender should necessarily ever be complete, and indeed it might be argued that it 
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is not even possible. This is because the disruptive process, that makes room for the other, 
must also leave some personal basis on which communication may be based; the notion of 
complete surrender is therefore implausible. What is plausible, however, is the move towards 
some kind of fusion of horizons (Gadamer, 1998) in which we might feel that the framed and 
reframed questions and answers constituting our conversations come to have common 
boundaries, even if the particular contents are necessarily different. In research relationships, 
researchers and the researched are changing both together and apart, which suggests that this 
notion of fusion may be an idealized notion in empirical research contexts. What may be 
more likely is that the disrupted, confused and self-emptied researcher seeks participation 
with a more static ‘partner’. That is, participation is most likely to be completed when the 
researcher engages in conversation with a classic (or in some way charismatic) text rather 
than a person. Indeed both of Archer’s (2007) most persuasive examples of this kind of 
participation relate to the ‘meta-reflexive’ individual’s engagement with classic texts: in one 
case English literature, in the other (rather more abstractly), scripture mediated by the 
Christian church. In such cases, it can be seen that the disturbed and ardent seeker finds that 
which ‘speaks to her condition’ and is then able to complete the reflexive cycle by relaxing 
back into the mode of repetition – but perhaps only for a time. If they are seriously disposed 
to radical reflexivity, they may well progress through the cycle again and again, abandoning 
old answers and seeking new questions. Is not this how a radically reflexive researcher might 
be characterized? 
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THE META-PROCESS OF REFLEXIVITY  
 
A possible sequential process and movement between the modes 
We have arrived, then, at a final conceptualization of reflexivity as a movement amongst and 
between all four of the modes outlined above. This is suggested by the revised diagram given 
as figure 2. 
 
Take in Figure 2 here 
 
Four interruptions or reversals to the process indicated in figure 2 can be suggested, however. 
First, the transition from repetition to extension may be abandoned by the organizational 
researcher simply choosing to exclude data which do not fit with her current set of 
assumptions – what may be more or less legitimately classified as the ‘exclusion of outliers’. 
Secondly, the transition from extension to disruption may be reversed if the researcher feels 
that the process is too uncomfortable, and/or that a more instrumental and less challenging 
approach would be more pragmatic (Weick, 1999). Thirdly, the transition from disruption to 
participation may never obtain, if the researcher becomes locked into a pattern of radical 
doubt which rejects the reality (however constructed) of everything.[2] The final reversal 
might come from participation which reaches towards a ‘fusion of horizons’ but then 
collapses into rejection and a confusing withdrawal into a process of disruption.  
 
Implications for research practice  
An important contribution of this paper is to make visible the relationships between what are 
traditionally regarded as immutable positions, governed by our theoretical perspectives, with 
regard to reflexivity. This has implications for academic and practitioner activities, in that 
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these positions are not a once and for all state; we move moment to moment, issue to issue at 
times. We may be entrenched in some views but open to exploration with and by others on 
different occasions. More importantly this paper argues for consideration of reflexivity as 
change in the organizational researcher as well as in the research activities. The paper also 
provides a framework around which to begin a discussion about our legitimizing practices for 
conducting and writing up our research. That is, by considering how reflexivity is apparent in 
thinking and subsequent doing (in academic and practitioner lives) the acts of researching and 
producing research artefacts should come under close scrutiny. Furthermore, with an 
increasing volume of research written in a reflexive mode (variously conceptualized), in this 
paper we contribute to promoting a nuanced understanding of the changing process of 
engaging with research material over time. 
 
The temporal dimension of the organizational researcher’s practice is rarely discussed in 
accounts of the research process. It is possible that the processes of repetition, extension, 
disruption and participation may take place in a particular research project, rather than and in 
addition to them being attributed to a researcher in a mutually exclusive manner. It is also 
possible to consider the cumulative process of reflexive practices applied across a sequence 
of research experiences lasting many years, each of which might be argued to subsume all 
previous iterations of the researchers’ practice. This may offer some explanation of the longer 
gestation periods associated with reflexive forms of research, in that individual researchers 
and research teams must simultaneously grapple with the specific instance of research and 
their past collection of research experiences. Furthermore, it is important to consider that 
organizational researchers also work in organizations. The relationship between reflexivity 
and ‘ordinary’ organizational life (particularly the transformative career changes that can be 
associated with the participation mode), alluded to earlier in our discussion, suggests that 
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radical reflexivity may result in researchers abandoning a conventional research career 
altogether. 
 
It is acknowledged, however, that the utilisation of a 2x2 matrix as a means of describing the 
complex processes of reflexivity (as in figure 2) is an oversimplification and might even be 
characterised as reductionist. In mitigation, we have already alluded to the potential for 
reversals and interruptions in the process, and a third dimension – a temporal one – is thus 
also implicit in our earlier treatment. Building on these earlier observations and critiques, we 
also consider that it is important that the divisions and demarcations in any such graphical 
representation be conceptualised as semi-permeable boundaries where leakage, transfer and 
slippage may occur. Above all, the characterization we have developed here should not be 
seen as a taxonomy, but rather as a way of understanding the possible inter-relationships 
between the two process dimensions we have identified, in individual and relational contexts. 
As we have argued in the introduction to the paper, we believe that there is much potential for 
confusion about the meaning of reflexivity, with many definitions which are based on 
assumptions about the theoretical perspective of the isolated organizational researcher. Here 
we have sought to lay out some of these distinctions, albeit in the rudimentary form of a 
model. We have also approached reflexivity from an alternative position in that we look at 
relationality and change and thereby are able to describe what the adoption of a reflexive 
stance may mean to the individual (researcher or practitioner) who is unavoidably engaged in 
social relations, rather than being an isolated monad choosing to adopt a particular position. 
Our approach, in challenging the boundaries between researchers and those that they 
research, has enabled us to provide an account of reflexivity that may be useful to 
practitioners as well as researchers.  
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Research agenda  
In order to explore the framework presented here, the next step in our journey could be to 
identify and review previously published empirical works which claim to have been 
conducted in a reflexive mode, to consider how the authors’ claims to reflexivity are 
represented in the texts of their written research. By engaging with such material we might 
ascertain how such representations of reflexivity correspond to the descriptions of the 
processes represented in this paper, thereby exploring the relevance of our conceptualization 
to understanding and supporting reflexive research at the level of a particular research 
project. However, we recognize that the ‘offstage’ conversations with reviewers and the other 
relationships that constitute the formation of a research ‘product’ are also intrinsic to the 
nature of reflexive processes, and their representation, in a particular research project. For 
that reason the project-level investigations alluded to above might be more fruitfully 
developed by conducting new research with the authors of reflexive empirical works, to 
investigate the nature of reflexivity as experienced by the authors of such works. In this way 
we might begin to further develop the temporal dimension of our conceptualization, by 
exploring the (perhaps multiple, overlapping and messy) relationships between the progress 
of particular research projects and the reflexive journey of the organizational researcher. 
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Figure 1: The dimensions of reflexivity 
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Figure 2: The meta-process of reflexivity 
 
                                               
[1]  A strong foundations perspective argues that any proposition should only be accepted if it is 
directly demonstrable in repeatable experimental evidence or clearly derived, through logical 
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argument, from such evidence. The problem is that the strong foundations proposition itself cannot 
be derived in that way. 
[2]  The kind of position offered in the radically negative postmodernism of Baudrillard, for example. 
